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ARTICLE
Peter A. Joy
Ethical Duty to Investigate Your Client?
Abstract. Lawyers have been implicated in corporate scandals and other
client crimes or frauds all too often, and the complicity of some lawyers is
troubling both to the public and to members of the legal profession. This is
especially true when the crime involved is money laundering. As a response to
attorney involvement in crimes or frauds, some legal commentators have called
for changes to the ethics rules to require lawyers to investigate their clients and
client transactions under some circumstances rather than remaining
“consciously” or “willfully” blind to what may be illegal or fraudulent conduct.
The commentators argue that such changes are needed because current ethics
rules require proof of a lawyer’s actual knowledge of a client’s crime or fraud.
It is surprising, then, that the American Bar Association Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility (CEPR) recently issued a formal ethics opinion
holding that a duty to investigate currently exists in the ethics rules even though
this is contrary to the plain text of the rules upon which the CEPR relied. In
finding a duty to investigate, was the CEPR interpreting the ethics rules or was
it legislating a new ethical duty? If it was interpreting the rules, is there
substantial support for such an interpretation? If the CEPR was, in effect,
legislating a new ethical duty, does it have the authority to do so? Regardless
of whether the CEPR was interpreting the ethics rules or attempting to create
a new duty under the ethics rules, should there be a duty to investigate? And,
if there is to be a duty to investigate, how should it be structured and adopted?
This Article explores these questions as it closely analyzes and evaluates the
CEPR’s ethics opinion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When there is corporate malfeasance or nonfeasance, we often hear the
familiar question: “Where were the lawyers?” We heard this question time
and time again concerning corporate scandals; for example, the savings and
loan banking failure of the 1980s,1 resulting in losses to taxpayers of
approximately $124 billion;2 the Enron scandal that emerged in 2001, which
led to huge losses to Enron’s employees and investors;3 the General Motors
(GM) cover-up of its ignition switch failures, which killed 124 persons and
led to hundreds of additional injuries before the 2014 recall of the defective
switches;4 and the opioid crisis,5 which resulted in approximately 450,000

1. Judge Stanley Sporkin, presiding over the collapse of Lincoln Savings & Loan stated:
Where were these professionals . . . when these clearly improper transactions were being
consummated? Why didn’t any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the
transactions? Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when these transactions
were effectuated? What is difficult to understand is that with all the professional talent involved
(both accounting and legal), why at least one professional would not have blown the whistle to
stop the overreaching that took place in this case.
Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990); Ed Hendricks & Mary
Berkheiser, Where Were the Lawyers?, LITIGATION, Summer 1992, at 30, 30.
2. Kenneth J. Robinson, Savings and Loan Crisis, 1980-1989, FED. RSRV. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/savings_and_loan_crisis [https://perma.cc/646Q-PB
FR].
3. See Richard Acello, Enron Lawyers in the Hot Seat, ABAJOURNAL (June 1, 2004),
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/enron_lawyers_in_the_hot_seat [https://perma.cc/
EZ9N-MADS] (reporting on potential claims of $10 billion in the Enron bankruptcy);
Christine Dugas, Employees’ Faith in Enron Cost Them Dearly, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2002, at B1
[https://perma.cc/TLY3-LUAG] (reporting on individual employee retirement losses exceeding
$1 million in some cases).
4. Chris Isidore, Death Toll for GM Ignition Switch: 124, CNN BUS. (Dec. 10, 2015),
https://money.cnn.com/2015/12/10/news/companies/gm-recall-ignition-switch-death-toll/index.
html [https://perma.cc/H4PD-NG49]; see also Michele Benedetto Neitz, Where Were the Lawyers?
The Ethical Implications of the General Motors Recall Scandal in the United States, 18 LEGAL ETHICS 93, 93
(2015) (“GM’s wrongful actions allegedly cost over sixty lives and hundreds of injuries.”).
5. Howard Udell, then general counsel for Purdue Pharma, pled guilty in federal court to
“a misdemeanor criminal charge related to misleading patients and doctors about the addictive nature
of OxyContin.” David Armstrong, Inside Purdue Pharma’s Media Playbook: How It Planted the Opioid “AntiStory”, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-purdue-pharmamedia-playbook-how-it-planted-the-opioid-anti-story [https://perma.cc/8FYM-4R8Q]. Judges and
lawyers—both those suing and those defending opioid makers, distributors, and retailers—have
routinely hidden evidence of the epidemic by sealing evidence. Benjamin Lesser et al., How Judges Added
to the Grim Toll of Opioids, REUTERS INVESTIGATES (June 25, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/invest
igates/special-report/usa-courts-secrecy-judges/ [https://perma.cc/TVU4-ZC78].
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people dying of overdoses from 1999 to 2018.6 In each instance, lawyers
were complicit in some way, often for what they failed to do rather than
what they did.7
Another area drawing attention to the role of lawyers is the global
problem of “money laundering,” in which some lawyers have been
complicit.8 Based on the enormity of this problem, concerns about the role
of lawyers in money laundering may be even greater than concerns of lawyer
involvement in corporate scandals. Money laundering accounts for 2–5%
of global gross national product, or “$800 billion [to] $2 trillion in current
U.S. dollars.”9 Not only are the amounts staggering, but laundered money

6. Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.
gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/6TRX-7H8J].
7. In the savings and loan collapse, charges against the law firm Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays
& Handler (Kaye Scholer) included making factual representations during the bank examination of
Lincoln Savings and Loan “that contained either material omissions or misstatements of fact.” Harris
Weinstein, Attorney Liability in the Savings and Loan Crisis, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 53, 53, 57 (1993). In the
Enron scandal, the complaint against the law firm of Vinson & Elkins alleged that “Vinson & Elkins
engaged and participated in . . . contrivances and manipulations to help inflate Enron’s reported
financial results.” Acello, supra note 3 (omission in original). With regard to the GM ignition switch
failures, some GM lawyers entered into a series of personal injury secret settlements related to the
ignition switch defect but did not report this to GM’s general counsel and did not report the safety
defect to regulators. Peter J. Henning, How G.M.’s Lawyers Failed in Their Duties, DEAL BOOK, N.Y.
TIMES (June 9, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/how-g-m-s-lawyers-failed-in-their
-duties/ [https://perma.cc/NXY7-CJ4J]. The full extent of lawyer complicity in the opioid crisis is
still not known, but the former general counsel to Purdue Pharma pled guilty to misleading patients
and doctors about the addictive nature of OxyContin, and other lawyers and judges are implicated for
keeping evidence of the opioid epidemic hidden. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
8. Money laundering usually involves three steps. First, illicit “dirty” cash, usually proceeds of
crime, are placed into the financial system in what is known as the placement stage. Next, there is the
layering or structuring phase in which funds are usually electronically transferred from one country to
another and divided into investments in overseas markets. Finally, there is the integration stage in
which the criminal recovers the money from a legitimate source, such as in the form of property,
jewelry, or other high-end goods, so the illicit source of the money is hidden. Money Laundering: A Three
Stage Process, ABOUT BUS. CRIME SOLS. INC., https://www.moneylaundering.ca/public/law/3_stages
_ML.php [https://perma.cc/K7B9-R6BU]. For examples of attorney misconduct regarding money
laundering, see United States v. Farrell, 921 F.3d 116, 122–23, 147 (4th Cir. 2019) (affirming the
conviction of a lawyer for laundering drug money); Laura Ernde, Escrow, Money Laundering Cases Draw
Attention to the Perils of Handling Client Money, CAL. BAR J. (Feb. 2017), http://www.calbarjournal.com/
February2017/TopHeadlines/TH1.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y334-PD7Q] (listing five lawyers
convicted of money laundering).
9. Money-Laundering, UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/
unodc/en/money-laundering/overview.html [https://perma.cc/Q3WV-LGMB].

2021]

Ethical Duty to Investigate Your Client?

419

often funds terrorists, the global drug trade, sex trafficking, and finances
dictators and oligarchs.10
The role of some lawyers in money laundering, corporate fraud, and
cover-ups has led to public criticism and scrutiny of the legal profession.11
Although we do not know how extensive lawyer involvement is in
undiscovered client crimes or frauds, the publicized scandals, indictments,
and the complicity of some lawyers is troubling both to the public and to
members of the legal profession.12
In response to attorney involvement in clients’ crimes or frauds, some
legal commentators have called for changes to the ethics rules to require
lawyers to investigate their clients and client transactions under some
circumstances, rather than remain “consciously” or “willfully” blind to a
client’s possibly illegal or fraudulent conduct.13 Such a change is necessary,
critics contend, because the present ethics rule prohibiting a lawyer from
assisting his or her client in fraud or a crime requires that “the lawyer knows
[the client’s conduct] is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”14 The question of what

10. Richard Malish, Are Lawyers Facilitating Money Laundering?, NICE ACTIMIZE (Apr. 14, 2017),
https://www.niceactimize.com/blog/are-lawyers-facilitating-money-laundering-534/ [https://perma.
cc/P642-DRKL].
11. See Opinion, Enron and the Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at A14, https://www.
nytimes.com/2002/01/28/opinion/enron-and-the-lawyers.html [https://perma.cc/6WDF-P7VY]
(calling on the ABA to change the ethics rules to require lawyers to prevent clients from committing
fraud); Robert Thomason, Lawyers, Real Estate Professionals Not Subject to Adequate US Money Laundering
Rules, Treasury Says, MLEX (Feb. 6, 2020), https://mlexmarketinsight.com/insights-center/editorspicks/area-of-expertise/anti-bribery-and-corruption/lawyers-real-estate-professionals-not-subject-toadequate-us-money-laundering-rules-treasury-says [https://perma.cc/THE9-6LFS] (discussing a U.S.
Treasury Department report that lawyers are assisting in money laundering).
12. Donald Langevoort made this same observation concerning lawyer involvement in financial
scandals. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’
Responsibilities for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 76–77 (1993) (stating the potential for incidents
of complicity is troubling to the public and the profession).
13. See George M. Cohen, The State of Lawyer Knowledge Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 115, 147 (2014) (arguing that the drafters of the Model Rules “should explicitly
adopt Judge Friendly’s definition of willful blindness in the definition of knowledge . . . in Model
Rule 1.0”); Rebecca Roiphe, The Ethics of Willful Ignorance, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 187, 220 (2011)
(“One way the ABA can embrace a more complex role for lawyers in the American system is by
explicitly forbidding them from avoiding their accepted public function by remaining willfully ignorant
of their clients’ wrongdoing.”).
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (emphasis added).
In full, the rule provides:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows
is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course
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a lawyer knows is critical because the ethics rules state “‘knows’ denotes
actual knowledge of the fact in question.”15 The general consensus among
legal commentators is “knows” or “knowledge” in the American Bar
Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules)
refers to actual knowledge without a duty to investigate.16 The Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (Restatement) reiterates this majority
view that “[u]nder the actual knowledge standard [in the Model Rules] . . . a
lawyer is not required to make a particular kind of investigation in order to ascertain
more certainly what the facts are, although it will often be prudent for the lawyer
to do so.”17 These legal commentators and the Restatement take a textual
approach consistent with the definition of knowledge in the Model Rules.18
However, at least one commentator has taken a different position that in
some instances a lawyer may not avoid knowledge by “averting one’s eyes
or turning one’s back” and failing to investigate a client.19

of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine
the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
Id.; see Cohen, supra note 13, at 147 (“The actual knowledge standard pervades the Model Rules and
applies to lawyers in all areas of practice, whether transactional, litigation, or criminal.”); Roiphe, supra
note 13, at 220 (“[C]ourts, legislatures, and administrative agencies are insisting that lawyers act as
regulators by refusing to accept their clients’ version of events when it is obviously distorted.”).
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (emphasis added).
16. See Mike Donaldson, Lawyers and the Panama Papers: How Ethical Rules Contribute to the Problem
and Might Provide a Solution, 22 L. & BUS. REV. AMERICAS 363, 374 (2016) (“There is no question that
the lawyers recorded by Global Witness should have known something fishy was going on, but there is
no proof they actually knew—and the ABA Rules did not explicitly require them to find out.”); Susan P.
Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1247
(2003) (“The ethics rules prohibit ‘knowing’ assistance of illegality. Can lawyers ever ‘know’ that x
behavior will violate the law?”); David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957, 976–79 (1999) (“The
ethics rules prohibit lawyers from knowingly counseling or assisting a client in fraud, but there’s no
duty to investigate the client and no willful blindness doctrine . . . . Perhaps, then, the legal ethics rules
should be modified so that willful and knowing ignorance count as knowledge.”).
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 94 cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 2020)
(emphasis added).
18. The Model Rules define “[k]nowingly,” “known,” and “knows” as “actual knowledge of the
fact in question.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f). The Model Rules additionally state
that as a method for providing actual knowledge, “[a] person’s knowledge may be inferred from
circumstances.” Id.
19. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.3.3, at 696 (1986). Charles
Wolfram applied the criminal law concept that willful blindness can be equated to knowledge in Model
Rule 1.2(d), and he contended that while a lawyer generally has no duty to investigate and seek
knowledge about a client, “some situations or known facts will be sufficiently suspicious that a
reasonable lawyer would want to know more.” Id.
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With this context, it is puzzling and troubling that the ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (CEPR) recently
issued an advisory ethics opinion in which it found that a lawyer has an
ethical duty to investigate, primarily under Model Rule 1.2(d),20 when a
client or prospective client tries to retain a lawyer for a transaction that could
be legitimate but which further inquiry may reveal to be criminal or
fraudulent.21 In ABA Formal Opinion 491 (2020),22 the CEPR opined that
a lawyer has a “duty to inquire further” and investigate when “a
lawyer . . . has knowledge of facts that create a high probability that a client
is seeking the lawyer’s services in a transaction to further criminal or
fraudulent activity.”23 In finding a duty to investigate, was the CEPR
interpreting the Model Rules or was it legislating a new ethical duty? If it
was interpreting the Model Rules, is there substantial support for such an
interpretation? If the CEPR was, in effect, legislating a new ethical duty,
does it have the authority to do so? Regardless of whether the CEPR was
interpreting the Model Rules or attempting to create a new duty under the
Model Rules, should there be a duty to investigate? And, if there is to be a
duty to investigate, how should it be structured and adopted? This Article
explores these questions. But first, it is important to place the CEPR in
context by understanding the authority of the Model Rules, the role of the
CEPR, and the influence of the CEPR’s legal ethics opinions on regulating
lawyer conduct.
20. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 2 (2020).
21. Id. at 1–2. The CEPR’s opinion explicitly referred to a duty to inquire, id. at 1, and relied
on authorities that discuss a duty to inquire interchangeably with a duty to investigate. See N.Y.C. Bar
Ass’n Comm. on Pro. Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-4, at 3 (2018) (“In general, assisting in a suspicious
transaction is not competent where a reasonable lawyer prompted by serious doubts would have
refrained from providing assistance or would have investigated to allay suspicions before rendering or
continuing to render legal assistance.” (emphasis added)); Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d
585, 590 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding against a law firm in an antitrust suit because the firm was aware of a
high probability that a client made illegal payments and failed to investigate); Harrell v. Crystal, 611 N.E.2d
908, 914 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (affirming a finding of liability in a malpractice action for a lawyer’s
failure to investigate sham tax shelters). This Article uses a duty to inquire interchangeably with a duty to
investigate.
22. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491 (2020).
23. Id. at 1–2. The CEPR stated that “‘transaction’ refers both to transactions and other nonlitigation matters unless otherwise indicated,” and its “opinion does not address the application of rules
triggering a duty to inquire where a client requests legal services in connection with litigation.” Id. at 2
n.6. As will be discussed later in Part III.B of this Article, unless specifically indicated in a rule of
professional conduct, the rules apply equally to all lawyers in all settings. See infra note 248 and
accompanying text. The CEPR does not have the authority to constrain how disciplinary authorities
may apply the CEPR’s opinion. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
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The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct serve as the basis for the
mandatory lawyer ethics rules in every state, the District of Columbia, and
the U.S. territories.24 Although the Model Rules set forth the various duties
and obligations a lawyer has to clients, the court, opposing parties and their
lawyers, and to the public, the CEPR issues formal and informal ethics
opinions interpreting the Model Rules and provides guidance to lawyers
concerning proper professional conduct in various circumstances.25 In
terms of the volume of ABA formal opinions, the CEPR has issued an
average of 3.6 opinions per year from 2000 through 2020.26
In addition to providing guidance to lawyers, the ABA ethics opinions
are important in several ways. For example, bar disciplinary authorities,
regulatory agencies, and courts considering discipline against a lawyer,
motions to disqualify, and fee requests often rely upon and cite to ABA
ethics opinions.27 State and local ethics committees also frequently cite to
and follow ABA ethics opinions,28 and in a number of jurisdictions state
24. Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, ABA, https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_
list_state_adopting_model_rules/ [https://perma.cc/XT9P-3WWZ]. The highest court, usually the
supreme court in each state, has the authority and power to adopt the ethics rules for lawyers.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 1 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2020).
25. ELLEN J. BENNETT & HELEN W. GUNNARSSON, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT vii (9th ed. 2019); Lawrence K. Hellman, When “Ethics Rules” Don’t Mean
What They Say: The Implications of Strained ABA Ethics Opinions, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 317, 324–25
(1996). “[T]he ABA created the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics” in 1913 and appended
“and Grievances” to its name in 1919. Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More
Effective Regulation of Lawyers’ Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 313, 349 n.201 (2002). Subsequently,
the ABA gave the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances the authority “to issue
advisory ethics opinions” in 1922. Id. In 1958, “the ABA changed the Committee’s name to the
Standing Committee on Professional Ethics,” and then finally to its current name, “the Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (CEPR)” in 1971. Id. The CEPR consists of
ten members and is empowered “by the concurrence of a majority of its members, [to] express its
opinion on proper professional or judicial conduct, either on its own initiative or when requested to
do so by a member of the bar or the judiciary.” AM. BAR ASS’N, 2020–2021 CONSTITUTION AND
BYLAWS: RULES OF PROCEDURE HOUSE OF DELEGATES art. 31, § 31.7, at 37 (2020). The CEPR also
has the authority to “recommend amendments to, or clarification of, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct or the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.” Id. art. 31, § 31.7, at 38.
26. From January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2020, the CEPR issued 76 formal opinions,
which averages out to 3.6 opinions per year. Index by Issue Dates, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional_responsibility/publications/ethics_opinions/index_by_issue_dates/ [https://
perma.cc/BZN5-UL2R].
27. Ted Finman & Theodore Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating
Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
29 UCLA L. REV. 67, 84–86 (1981).
28. Id. at 82–83.

2021]

Ethical Duty to Investigate Your Client?

423

ethics opinions are binding upon courts and lawyer disciplinary bodies
interpreting duties created by the ethics rules.29 Legal ethics opinions can
also serve as a source of bargaining leverage in negotiations “between
lawyers and their clients or their employers.”30 Finally, legal ethics “treatises
and law school casebooks” cite to ABA ethics opinions,31 thus helping to
inform a law student’s understanding of a lawyer’s ethical obligations. For
legal ethics opinions to serve these functions effectively, they must be well
reasoned, rely upon the appropriate ethics rules and authorities interpreting
the rules, be free from authors’ self-interest, and be able to stand up to
critical review.
Most commentators considering legal ethics opinions, especially ABA
formal opinions, criticize them for being of poor quality and based on
flawed reasoning;32 further, some claim the ethics committees issuing the
opinions are dysfunctional.33 My own position, which I have stated in the
past based on an in-depth study of legal ethics opinions,34 is that because
they play an important role for bar discipline and matters before courts and
agencies involving legal ethics,35 steps should be taken to improve “the
quality and integrity of the opinions.”36 Because legal ethics opinions are
so important, it is necessary to examine them carefully and to identify those
that strain to reach a conclusion not supported by the Model Rules. As this
Article will demonstrate, ABA Formal Opinion 491 is one such opinion.
In offering this critique, I am not necessarily asserting that a lawyer should
not have a duty to investigate under circumstances such as the ones the
CEPR sets out, but rather that such a duty does not currently exist in the

29. See Joy, supra note 25, at 337 (identifying the jurisdictions where following an ethics opinion
issued at the state level will serve as a bar against discipline or failing to follow the ethics opinion will
be the basis for discipline).
30. Finman & Schneyer, supra note 27, at 90–91.
31. Id. at 71.
32. See id. at 97–105 (finding several ABA ethics opinions to be “clearly wrong” and the
reasoning in many to be “deficient in one or more respects”); Hellman, supra note 25, at 336 (finding
“four ABA formal opinions that have taken positions not supported by the text of the ABA model
provisions they purported to interpret”).
33. Bruce A. Green, Bar Association Ethics Committees: Are They Broken?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 731,
740 (2002) (“Most commentators have concluded that the ethics committees are dysfunctional.”).
34. See Joy, supra note 25, at 340–49 (discussing qualitative and quantitative analyses of ethics
opinions).
35. See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.
36. Joy, supra note 25, at 382 (recommending that state high courts delegate to disciplinary
counsel the authority to issue ethics opinions and that there be a review process for the opinions).
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plain language of the Model Rules.37 The CEPR opinion is flawed because
it is contrary to the majority view of Model Rule 1.2(d),38 conflicts with
many of the authorities the CEPR relied upon,39 is at odds with the text of
other Model Rules,40 and ignores the legislative history surrounding Model
Rule 1.2(d).41 Moreover, if there is going to be a duty to investigate, the
ABA should deliberately consider the pros and cons and craft an
amendment to the Model Rules that sets forth the duty clearly and
completely.42
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II discusses the circumstances
that the CEPR identified as the reasons why it issued the opinion. Part III
includes discussion and development of criteria for evaluating CEPR formal
opinions, which include (1) the opinion’s textual analysis of relevant Model
Rules, (2) the opinion’s identification and analysis of relevant authorities,
(3) any problems of interpretive choice in the opinion, (4) rigor of the
opinion’s analysis, and (5) its clarity. Finally, Part IV explores whether there
should be a duty to investigate and, if so, what process should lead to
creating such a duty in the Model Rules.
II. WHY THE OPINION?
The role of lawyers in money laundering underlies Formal Opinion 491,
and the CEPR began its opinion by referring to media reports,43 disciplinary
proceedings,44 and criminal prosecutions of lawyers involved in client
money laundering and other criminal activities.45 In light of these
37. See infra Part III.B.1.
38. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
39. See infra Part III.B.2.
40. See infra Part III.B.3.
41. See infra notes 194–99 and accompanying text.
42. See infra Conclusion.
43. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 1 (2020) (citing Debra Cassens
Weiss, Group Goes Undercover at 13 Law Firms to Show How US Laws Facilitate Anonymous Investment,
ABAJOURNAL (Feb. 1, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/group_
goes_undercover_at_13_law_firms_to_show_how_us_laws_facilitate [https://perma.cc/65QR-68
A2]; Louise Story & Stephanie Saul, Stream of Foreign Wealth Flows to Elite New York Real Estate, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/nyregion/stream-of-foreign-wealthflows-to-time-warner-condos.html [https://perma.cc/9ENC-2LSZ]).
44. The CEPR cited one disciplinary case wherein a lawyer was disbarred “for assisting [a] client
in money laundering.” ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 1 (citing In re
Albrecht, 42 P.3d 887, 898–900 (Or. 2002)).
45. The CEPR cited two federal criminal cases in which attorneys were convicted of
participating in money laundering and money laundering conspiracy. Id. (citing United States v. Farrell,
921 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Blair, 661 F.3d 755 (4th Cir. 2011)). The CEPR also
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developments, the CEPR stated that its opinion addressed a lawyer’s ethical
“obligation to inquire when faced with a client” seeking the lawyer’s
assistance in “a transaction or other non-litigation matter that could be
legitimate but” investigation could “reveal to be criminal or fraudulent.”46
The first media account the CEPR cited was a story in the ABA Journal
about a 60 Minutes broadcast in which Global Witness recorded an
undercover investigator going to thirteen law firms posing as the
representative of a governmental official from a poor country who wanted
to move millions of dollars in suspicious funds into the U.S. without
triggering an investigation as to the source of the funds.47 Fifteen of the
sixteen lawyers filmed—including the “then-ABA president48—offered
advice on how” the funds could be used to purchase real estate and highvalue personal property using shell companies without revealing the identity
of the government official, including two lawyers at one law firm who
suggested how they could use their law firm accounts to help move the
money between overseas accounts and the United States.49 Another lawyer
discussed how overseas bank accounts could be set up using a straw person
to hide the government official’s identity.50
Two professors who teach legal ethics, William Simon at Columbia
School of Law and John Leubsdorf at Rutgers School of Law, opined that
if any of the lawyers had used their law firm accounts to move money or
cited the State Bar of California, which discussed several discipline cases in which lawyers misused their
escrow accounts, including using their escrow accounts to assist in money laundering. Id. (citing Ernde,
supra note 8).
46. See id. at 1–2 (“[A] client might propose an all-cash deal in large amounts and ask that the
proceeds be deposited in a bank located in a jurisdiction where transactions of this kind are commonly
used to conceal terrorist financing or other illegal activities. On the other hand, further inquiry may
dispel the lawyer’s concerns.” (footnote omitted)).
47. Cassens Weiss, supra note 43. Global Witness is a not-for-profit and describes itself as
“[c]hallenging abuses of power to protect human rights and secure the future of our planet.” About
Us, GLOBAL WITNESS, https://www.globalwitness.org/en/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/K3K5-3F
T8]. Global Witness states that it focuses on investigations into “who is stealing the money, where
they are hiding it, and how they are spending it. We track and expose the path of corruption, pushing
for global change to end it.” Id.
48. The ABA President was James Silkenat. GLOBAL WITNESS, LOWERING THE BAR 9 (2016),
http://www.globalwitness.org/documents/18208/Lowering_the_Bar.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FEBCSUC]. During the meeting with the investigator, “Silkenat and his colleague, Hugh Finnegan, made”
it clear that before accepting the foreign “minister as a client they would need to know more about
him and all the facts.” Further, they would have “to make sure that no crimes had been committed in
the U.S. or elsewhere,” and “if crimes had been committed, they would have to report” the crimes. Id.
49. Cassens Weiss, supra note 43.
50. GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 48, at 7.
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assisted in “setting up overseas bank accounts using a straw man,” such
lawyers would have violated ethics rules.51
In fact, two of the lawyers featured in the exposé faced professional
discipline and agreed to public censures.52 One of the lawyers disciplined
met with the Global Witness investigator posing as a potential client seeking
to purchase real estate, “an airplane, and a yacht” on behalf of an unnamed
minister of a foreign country, saying that the fund would be “gray money”
or “black money.”53 In response, the lawyer offered ideas on how to move
the money from other countries into the United States in a way that would
shield the minister’s name as the owner.54 The second lawyer met with the
investigator, who again discussed making purchases with money the man
suggested came from questionable sources that “[he] wouldn’t name [a]
bribe; [but rather] facilitation money.”55 The lawyer informed the man that
he could hide the true source of the money by setting up shell corporations
to own the properties and that attorney-client privilege would protect
everyone involved because “[t]hey don’t send the lawyers [in the United
States] to jail because we run the country.”56 In both discipline cases, the
lawyers stipulated that their conduct included counseling a client to engage
in conduct they knew was illegal or fraudulent.57
Only one lawyer refused outright to be involved during his meeting with
the undercover agent,58 and another law firm sent an email after the meeting
indicating that they could not help.59 Most of the lawyers were silent on
whether they would assist in apparently illegal conduct, and most did not
seek the type of information necessary to determine if the client’s plans were

51. Cassens Weiss, supra note 43.
52. Si Aydiner, Money Laundering, Lawyers, and Escrow: The Case for Voluntary Due Diligence, N.Y.
L.J. (Apr. 1, 2020, 11:45 AM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/04/01/money-laun
dering-lawyers-and-escrow-the-case-for-voluntary-due-diligence/ [https://perma.cc/FVK4-GT7A].
53. In re Jankoff, 81 N.Y.S.3d 733, 734 (App. Div. 2018) (discussing the attorney meeting with
persons posing as clients to purchase certain assets); see also GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 48, at 5
(noting an attempted bribe of the attorney by the Global Witness agent).
54. Jankoff, 81 N.Y.S.3d at 734.
55. In re Koplik, 90 N.Y.S.3d 187, 188 (App. Div. 2019).
56. Id. (alteration in original).
57. See Jankoff, 81 N.Y.S.3d at 734; Koplik, 90 N.Y.S.3d at 188.
58. This attorney was Jeffrey Herrman. He refused to provide any suggestions on how to move
the money, saying: “[Representing the foreign minister is] not for me, it’s, it’s too grey for me,” and
asked the investigator to leave his office. GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 48, at 6; see Cassens Weiss,
supra note 43 (explaining Global Witness’s process of investigating thirteen law firms).
59. GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 48, at 1.
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legal.60 All the meetings were preliminary, and none of the firms agreed to
represent the government official,61 but what if they had?
As a practical matter, if a lawyer knowingly assists a client in committing
a crime, the government is able to charge the lawyer with the underlying
crime the same as the client committing the crime under well-established
accomplice criminal liability doctrine.62 If it is a civil fraud and not a crime,
the lawyer may be subject to civil liability for assisting the client in the
fraud.63
Similarly, the lawyer will be subject to professional discipline if the lawyer
knowingly assists or counsels a client to engage in a crime or fraud. Model
Rule 1.2(d) states:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that
the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may
counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity,
scope, meaning or application of the law.64

The plain language of the prohibition in this rule is limited to “counsel[ing]
a client to engage, or assist[ing] a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent . . . .”65 As will be discussed in more depth later in
this Article, what a lawyer knows or does not know, what constitutes

60. Id. at 2.
61. Id. at 1.
62. Under the common law concept of aiding and abetting, one may be charged for the crime
and punished as a principal for aiding, abetting, or counseling the commission of a crime. See
Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 72 (2014) (“The common law imposed aiding and abetting
liability on a person (possessing the requisite intent) who facilitated any part—even though not every
part—of a criminal venture.”). The common law principles are codified in the federal aiding and
abetting statute, which provides:
(a)

Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aid, abets, counsels, commands,
induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.

(b)

Whoever willfully causes an act to be done if directly performed by him or another would
be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.

18 U.S.C. § 2.
63. See, e.g., Eugene J. Schiltz, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting: Should Lawyers Be “Privileged”
to Assist Their Clients’ Wrongdoing?, 29 PACE L. REV. 75, 77 (2008) (discussing “a number of cases,
[in which] . . . courts have applied civil aiding and abetting principles to lawyers . . .”).
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (emphasis added).
65. Id.
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knowledge in the Model Rules, and what a lawyer must do to investigate are
key aspects in evaluating the CEPR’s opinion.66
Because some lawyers were involved in money laundering or other illegal
activities of their clients, the CEPR emphasized lawyers must be alert to the
possibility that certain clients or potential clients may be requesting legal
assistance for money laundering, terrorism, or other illegal activities.67 For
example, a client requesting legal assistance for transactions such as
arranging a series of sales and purchases of properties may be involved in
money laundering.68 Or a prospective client proposing all-cash deals
involving large sums of money to be deposited in banks in a jurisdiction
where these types of transactions are frequently used to conceal illegal
activities, such as terrorist financing, may be seeking to employ a lawyer to
facilitate a crime.69
In such situations that may involve a crime or fraud, the CEPR stated
“further inquiry may dispel the lawyer’s concerns” or lead the lawyer to
conclude that assisting the client or prospective client would be providing
legal assistance to further criminal or fraudulent activity.70 This is good
advice, but was the CEPR correct in concluding that a lawyer who fails to
investigate the client proposing such transactions has violated the Model
Rules?71 The following section examines and evaluates the CEPR’s
opinion.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF FORMAL OPINION 491
Commentators have criticized some ABA formal ethics opinions for,
among other reasons, not citing the relevant ethics rules and authorities, not
addressing conflicting and ambiguous ethics rules, and for lacking clarity.72

66. See infra notes 186–92 and accompanying text.
67. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp, Formal Op. 491, at 1–2 (2020).
68. Id. at 2.
69. Id. The CEPR refers to an ABA task force report that lists institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund, a credible source of information for identifying countries where there is
a higher risk of money laundering or funding of terrorist activities. See AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE
ON GATEKEEPER REGUL. & THE PRO., VOLUNTARY GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE FOR LAWYERS
TO DETECT AND COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING 15–16 (2010) (noting
organizations that provide information on corrupt sources of money).
70. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 2 (noting lawyers should
ensure they are not assisting in committing unlawful acts).
71. See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text.
72. See Finman & Schneyer, supra note 27, at 104–09 (providing examples of various ABA ethics
opinions attempting to address ambiguous ethics rules).
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Another commentator has focused his criticisms on ABA formal opinions
“not supported by the text of the ABA model provisions they purported to
interpret.”73 Given these criticisms, how does ABA Formal Opinion 491
stack up against other opinions that commentators have critically examined?
A. Criteria for Evaluating ABA Formal Opinions
1.

Finman/Schneyer Criteria

Ted Finman and Theodore Schneyer wrote the first serious examination
of ABA formal opinions analyzing all of the opinions issued in a ten-year
period.74 They analyzed twenty-one opinions containing forty-eight distinct
holdings analyzing the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(Model Code) from the time the Model Code went into effect in 1970 until
the end of their study in 1979.75 The Model Rules replaced the Model Code
in 1983.76
Finman and Schneyer developed a system for analyzing the opinions in
which they measured if the opinion reached the correct result. In evaluating
the opinions, Finman and Schneyer considered the following factors:
“(a) identification of a tenable, rule-based rationale; (b) identification of
relevant authorities; (c) identification of problems of interpretive choice;
(d) careful analysis of problems of interpretive choice; and (e) clarity.”77 In
their system, they labeled an opinion “to be correct if . . . [the holding]
follow[ed] . . . the unambiguous meaning of the Code or, where the Code is
ambiguous, from interpretations based on generally accepted value
choices.”78 They judged an opinion to be wrong if the opinion was
“illogical or based on value judgments not likely to be widely accepted.”79
Finman and Schneyer explained their criteria and how they applied them.
They stated the “tenable rationale” criterion required the opinion to refer to
the ethics rule that supports the holding for which the rule is cited, and the
73. Hellman, supra note 25, at 336.
74. See Finman & Schneyer, supra note 27, at 92–93. During the period in question, the CEPR
issued both formal and informal ethics opinions. Finman and Schneyer confined their study to the
formal ethics opinions because the formal opinions address matters of widespread importance and
they presumed the CEPR put more care and attention into preparing them. See id. at 92 (stating the
Committee issued hundreds of opinions over the decade, but only issued twenty-one formal opinions).
75. Id. at 72, 92.
76. See Joy, supra note 25, at 316 n.7 (detailing adoption of the Model Rules).
77. Finman & Schneyer, supra note 27, at 95.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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text of the rule appears to support the opinion.80 “[I]dentification of
relevant authorities” required the opinion cite to relevant ethics rules and
earlier ethics opinions, and focused on the pertinent portions of the rules or
opinions cited.81 “[P]roblems of interpretive choice” referred to whether
the opinion addressed when different ethics rules led to conflicting results,
when an ethics rule was ambiguous, and whether the opinion noted the
problems and “considered the implications of relevant values, precedents,
and legislative history.”82
In terms of “clarity,” Finman and Schneyer referred to the fact that the
Model Code contained legal binding Disciplinary Rules (DRs) and
aspirational Ethical Considerations (ECs).83 For there to be clarity in an
ethics opinion, it had to state clearly if it was based on DRs, which would
be asserting a legal duty, or upon ECs, which would lead to a debatable
conclusion.84 In interpreting the Model Code, such clarity was important
to provide clear guidance for a lawyer’s conduct both to avoid engaging in
unethical conduct and to prevent unwarranted disciplinary proceedings
against a lawyer when the conduct was not clearly prohibited.85 Finman’s
and Schneyer’s definition of clarity is no longer useful in evaluating ABA
formal opinions because the Model Rules no longer consist of DRs and
ECs. However, clarity is still a useful criterion when it refers to an ethics
opinion that is explicit and clearly defined.
Based on their system of evaluating the holdings in the ethics opinions,
Finman and Schneyer identified twenty-one as “correct” and seven as
“clearly wrong.”86 They also classified twenty holdings as being based on
“debatable” value choices some reasonable lawyers might reject.87
At the end of their groundbreaking study of ABA formal opinions,
Finman and Schneyer called for more critical review of the formal opinions
as a way to improve the work of the CEPR and to provide for some level

80. Id.
81. Id. at 95–96.
82. Id. at 96.
83. See id. (noting the place of DRs and ECs in the structure of opinions).
84. See id. (providing DRs create a legal duty while ECs are goals).
85. See id. (illustrating the negative impact of opinions lacking clarity).
86. Id. at 97, 101.
87. Id. at 102. Examples of opinions that are debatable include those opinions reaching
conclusions not supported by the language in an ethics rule. Id. at 102 n.128.
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of accountability.88 They noted such critical reviews were rare,89 and such
reviews have remained rare in the decades following their study.90
2.

Hellman Textual Approach

Lawrence Hellman responded to the call by Finman and Schneyer to
examine critically ABA formal opinions by identifying and critiquing four
formal opinions not supported by the text of the ABA model provisions the
CEPR claimed it interpreted.91 His analysis was straightforward and
textual, and he identified two formal opinions based on the Model Code,92
and two formal opinions based on the Model Rules,93 where the CEPR’s
conclusions were not supported by the plain text of the model provisions.
In terms of the opinions that purported to interpret the Model Rules,
Hellman contended that, by disregarding the text of the model provisions,
the CEPR issued opinions that concluded the ethics rules do not mean what
they say.94 Hellman maintained when the CEPR issues opinions reaching
conclusions not supported by the language in the rules, the opinions create
uncertainty and undermine respect for the ethics rules in general.95
To illustrate Hellman’s point, it is helpful to consider his critiques of the
two ABA formal opinions interpreting provisions of the Model Rules.96

88. See id. at 150 (noting the valuable nature of criticism and finding it regrettable that there is
not more criticism of the CEPR).
89. See id. (depicting the lack of legal scholarship over CEPR opinions).
90. There have been only five critical law journal examinations of ABA formal ethics opinions
since Finman’s and Schneyer’s article was published in 1981, and four of the five articles examined and
critiqued only one opinion. See Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics
Walks, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 247–48 (1996) (criticizing ABA Formal Op. 94-389); Susan Saab
Fortney, Professional Responsibility and Liability Issues Related to Limited Liability Law Partnerships, 39 S. TEX.
L. REV. 399, 405 (1998) (criticizing ABA Formal Op. 96-401); Hellman, supra note 25, at 336, 342, 347,
351 (criticizing ABA Formal Ops. 339, 342, 95-394, and 95-396); Jack L. Sammons, Giving Advice: ABA
Formal Advisory Opinion 90-358, 12 MISS. C. L. REV. 143, 144 (1991) (criticizing ABA Formal Op.
90-358); Kirsten M. Schimpff, Rule 3.8, The Jencks Act, and How the ABA Created a Conflict Between Ethics
and the Law on Prosecutorial Disclosure, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1729, 1729 (2012) (criticizing ABA Formal
Op. 09-454).
91. See Hellman, supra note 25, at 336 (noting a contradiction between what a rule means versus
what it says).
92. Id. at 336–45 (critiquing Formal Ops. 339 and 342).
93. Id. at 347–59 (critiquing Formal Ops. 95-394 and 95-396).
94. Id. at 336.
95. Id.
96. The focus of this Article is solely on the formal ethics opinions interpreting the Model Rules
because the Model Rules are the basis for ethics rules currently in place. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.

432

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 11:414

First, Hellman analyzed ABA Formal Opinion 95-394,97 which concluded
a lawyer is prohibited from entering into a settlement agreement restricting
the lawyer’s right to undertake other representations against a government
agency.98 Hellman found the opinion was in direct conflict with the express
language of Model Rule 5.6, which, at the time, stated: “A lawyer shall not
participate in offering or making . . . an agreement in which a restriction on
the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between
private parties.”99 Hellman pointed out this limitation on settlement
agreements applied only to those involving private parties and not public entities
such as governmental agencies or units.100
In explaining why the CEPR interpreted Model Rule 5.6(b) contrary to
its express language, the CEPR’s opinion stated that “the phrase in question
[between private parties] is sensibly to be read as merely descriptive . . . [and
not] prescriptive: i.e., as referring to the circumstances where such a
provision, as a condition of settlement, is most likely to be proposed; rather
than as limiting the kinds of settlements to which the prohibition is
applicable.”101 Hellman noted that the CEPR’s reasoning was largely based
on the fact the predecessor rule, DR 2-108(B),102 contained no language
limiting the prohibition to settlements “between private parties[,]” and
because there was no explanation in the legislative history or official
commentary for the language change, “Model Rule 5.6(b) must be
interpreted as if it had not been changed.”103
While Hellman did not argue with the principle that Model Rule 5.6(b)
should apply to settlements with governmental entities, he did object to the
CEPR giving a strained reading of the rule rather than requesting the
language of the rule be amended to reach the result the CEPR wanted.104
97. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 95-394 (1995).
98. Hellman, supra note 25, at 347–48; ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal
Op. 95-394, at 3.
99. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) [hereinafter 1983
Model Rules] (emphasis added); see also Ethics 2000—February 2002 Report, ABA, https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2k_56_202/
[https://perma.cc/2TWF-CC8U] (illustrating the changes made to Rule 5.6 in February 2002).
100. Hellman, supra note 25, at 349.
101. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 95-394, at 3.
102. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. DR 2-108(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“In connection
with the settlement of a controversy or suit, a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement that restricts his
right to practice law.”).
103. Hellman, supra note 25, at 350.
104. See id. at 351 (noting the desire for an amendment to fix the problems with the Model
Rule).
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He noted, and I agree, claiming the express language in a Model Rule really
means something it does not explicitly state will lead to confusion among
both lawyers and disciplinary authorities.105
Next, Hellman analyzed and critiqued ABA Formal Opinion 95-396,106
which addressed whether the version of Model Rule 4.2 in effect at the time
of the opinion prohibited a lawyer representing a client from
communicating with another represented “person” or only another
The heading of Model Rule 4.2 was
represented “party.”107
“Communication with Person Represented by Counsel,” but the text of
Model Rule 4.2 stated: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer
has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.”108
This conclusion, that “party” really meant “person” was not without
controversy. Six of the ten members of the CEPR believed “party” should
be construed to mean “represented person,” because the term “party” in the
text of Model Rule 4.2 was unexplained.109 Two committee members
wrote a concurrence to address concerns they had with the majority opinion
and two committee members wrote separate dissents.110 The two
concurring members of the CEPR characterized the dissent of one other
member as “flawed” for concluding that Model Rule 4.2 is limited to
“parties” and not “persons” because they found the member’s literal reading
of the rule to be at odds with the purpose of the rule.111
As with his critique of ABA Formal Opinion 95-394, Hellman was not
taking issue with what should be the scope of the rule in question, but rather
with the CEPR’s strained reasoning to find that the express language in an

105. Id. The ABA did amend Model Rule 5.6, which now reads: “A lawyer shall not participate
in offering or making: . . . (b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is
part of the settlement of a client controversy.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2020).
106. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 95-396 (1995). The ideas and text at
notes 106–11 are also used and explored in Joy, supra note 25, at 353.
107. Hellman, supra note 25, at 351–353.
108. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (emphasis added).
109. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 95–396, at 6 n.15 (“The
comprehensive record of the deliberations of the Kutak Commission [which drafted the Model Rules]
casts no light on the reason why the word ‘person’ was used in the caption of the Rule while ‘party’
was used in its text.”).
110. Id. at 21–30.
111. Id. at 23.
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ethics rule did not mean what it stated.112 Hellman also agreed with the
dissent that the CEPR should not have issued the opinion, but rather it
should have waited because the CEPR had a proposal pending with the
ABA House of Delegates to amend Model Rule 4.2 to replace the word
“party” with “person.”113 Hellman noted that shortly after the CEPR
issued its opinion, the ABA House of Delegates amended Model Rule 4.2
to replace “party” with “person” in the text of the rule.114
Though he did not say so, Hellman’s textual analysis focused largely on
the first criterion Finman and Schneyer used: whether an ABA formal ethics
opinion referred to the ethics rule that supported the holding for which the
rule was cited, and that the text of the rule appeared to support the
opinion.115 Each of the opinions that Hellman identified failed to satisfy
this requirement because, in each instance, the CEPR’s opinion stated that
the language in an ethics rule did not mean what it said.
B. Evaluating ABA Formal Opinion 491
Two questions any lawyer representing a client in a transaction should
want answered after reading the CEPR’s opinion are: What is the basis for
the duty to investigate, and when must a lawyer investigate a client? As this
following analysis demonstrates, the CEPR loosely answered these
questions, but in the process raised and left a number of other questions
unaddressed.
The CEPR began its analysis from the vantage point that clients “are
generally entitled to be believed rather than doubted, and in some contexts
investigations can be both costly and time-consuming.”116 But, the CEPR
continued, stating: “A lawyer’s obligation to inquire when faced with
circumstances addressed in this opinion is well-grounded in authority
interpreting Rule 1.2(d) and in the rules on competence, diligence,
communication, honesty, and withdrawal.”117 The CEPR stated the duty
to investigate is triggered when “a lawyer . . . has knowledge of facts that
create a high probability that a client is seeking the lawyer’s services in a
112. Hellman, supra note 25, at 353–54.
113. Id. at 356–57. The ABA House of Delegates is the legislative body of the ABA and has
the authority to formulate policy. AM. BAR ASS’N, 2020–21 CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS: RULES OF
PROCEDURE HOUSE OF DELEGATES art. 6, § 6.1, at 4 (2020).
114. Hellman, supra note 25, at 357.
115. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
116. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 2 (2020).
117. Id.
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transaction to further criminal or fraudulent activity” so that the lawyer may
“avoid assisting that activity under Rule 1.2(d).”118 According to the
CEPR, failure to inquire under such circumstances “is willful blindness
punishable under the actual knowledge standard of the Rule.”119
But how well-grounded is the duty to investigate in Rule 1.2(d) and the
other rules? Does the CEPR provide lawyers sufficient guidance about what
triggers this duty to investigate one’s own client or potential client? And
how would disciplinary authorities determine a lawyer engaged in willful
blindness that establishes actual knowledge under the ethical rules?
The following analysis evaluates ABA Formal Opinion 491 by
incorporating elements of the test developed by Finman and Schneyer along
with Hellman’s focus on the textual analysis. The criteria I use are:
(a) Identification of a tenable, rule-based rationale—textual analysis;
(b) Identification of relevant authorities;
(c) Problems of interpretive choice;
(d) Rigor; and
(e) Clarity.
As the criteria indicate, I am incorporating Hellman’s focus on the text
of the Model Rules with the identification of a tenable, rule-base rationale.
Identification of relevant authorities includes not only the Model Rules and
prior ABA ethics opinions, but also cases and secondary authorities,
especially those the CEPR relied upon in ABA Formal Opinion 491. I
analyze problems of interpretive choice using the Finman/Schneyer
definition.120 Regarding rigor, I analyze the opinion to see if it sufficiently
addressed all of the questions that lawyers—and bar disciplinary
authorities—would want addressed. Finally, clarity refers to whether the
opinion’s holding is explicit and clearly defined.
1. Identification of a Tenable, Rule-Based Rationale—Textual
Analysis
The first criterion requires that a correct ABA formal ethics opinion must
be based on a tenable, rule-based rationale supported by the text of the
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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Model Rules. As the following analysis indicates, Formal Opinion 491 does
not meet this criterion.
The CEPR claimed the duty to investigate primarily arises out of Model
Rule 1.2(d)’s admonition that a lawyer “shall not counsel a client to engage,
or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent.”121 The language of Model Rule 1.2(d), though, speaks only of
a prohibition on counseling or assisting. It says nothing about a mandate to
inquire of the client or the other aspects of the proposed transaction. The
CEPR’s analysis somehow derives a duty to investigate from the knowledge
element in Rule 1.2(d) and the definition of knowledge in Model Rule 1.0(f),
which states that “‘knows’ denotes actual knowledge of the fact in
question.”122
To support its conclusion, the CEPR quoted the concluding phrase in
Rule 1.0(f), which states “knowledge may be inferred from
circumstances.”123 This portion of Rule 1.0(f) states nothing more than the
obvious evidentiary reality that an internal mental state, such as knowledge,
purpose, or premeditation, to name just a few, can be and often is proven
through the use of circumstantial evidence—evidence that is “based on
inference and not on personal knowledge or observation.”124 Thus, the
fact that “knowledge may be inferred from circumstances” is not relevant
to what knowledge means, but rather how knowledge may be proven. The definition
of knowledge in the Model Rules does not support either the use of the
willful blindness doctrine or the imposition of a duty to investigate. Here,
the CEPR’s analysis confuses what must be proven (the mental state of
knowledge) with how it may be proven, which includes circumstantial (as
well as direct) evidence.125

121. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 3 (emphasis added) (quoting
Model Rule 1.2(d)).
122. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“‘Knowingly,’
‘known,’ or ‘knows’ denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s knowledge may be
inferred from circumstances.”).
123. Id.
124. See Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “circumstantial
evidence” as “[e]vidence based on inference and not on personal knowledge or observation,” also
referred to as “indirect evidence” or “oblique evidence”).
125. See id. (defining “direct evidence” as “[e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or
observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption,” also referred to as
“positive evidence”).
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By ignoring the plain meaning of “knows” as defined in the Model Rules,
the CEPR is doing exactly what Hellman decried. The CEPR is saying
Model Rule 1.2(d) does not mean what it says.
2.

Identification of Relevant Authorities

ABA Formal Opinion 491 relied heavily on authorities in addition to the
Model Rules and prior ABA ethics opinions. My analysis encompasses
those additional authorities as well as the Model Rules and prior ethics
opinions.
In the text of its opinion, the CEPR relied heavily on In re Blatt126 as
authority for interpreting Model Rule 1.2(d) to include a duty to
investigate.127 In Blatt, the New Jersey Supreme Court disciplined Martin
Blatt for, among other reasons, participating in a fraudulent real estate
transaction.128 At the direction of two clients, both real estate brokers, Blatt
prepared two contracts for sale of property where a husband and wife were
selling the property to an individual.129 The first contract listed the husband
and wife as the sellers with a purchase price of $95,000 and the purchaser’s
line was left blank; the second contract left the seller’s line blank with a
purchase price of $120,000 and the purchaser’s line contained the name of
the intended purchaser.130 The CEPR quoted from Blatt that the lawyer
participated in a transaction where “[o]n their face the [transaction] documents
suggest[ed] impropriety if not outright illegality.”131 The CEPR also quoted
a passage from the decision that a lawyer must be satisfied that a client is
seeking a legitimate goal and that Blatt had a duty to “learn all the details of
the proposed transaction” and, only if satisfied that the clients’ proposed
course of conduct was proper, to then proceed.132 While the language the
CEPR quoted is consistent with the CEPR’s position about a duty to
investigate, the court in Blatt did not cite to any ethical rule or case as
authority for its reasoning. In disciplining the lawyer, the court appeared
primarily motivated not by Blatt’s failure to investigate but rather by his

126. In re Blatt, 324 A.2d 15 (N.J. 1974).
127. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 3 (2020) (utilizing Blatt as the
way to interpret Rule 1.2(d)).
128. Blatt, 324 A.2d at 18.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 3 (alteration in original)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Blatt, 324 A.2d at 18).
132. Id.; Blatt, 324 A.2d at 18–19.
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participation in a transaction that was, on its face, fraudulent or illegal133
and by a conflict of interest Blatt had in drafting the contracts.134
The CEPR also cited in a footnote, as authority consistent with Blatt,
three discipline cases and one state bar ethics opinion.135 Each discipline
case involved a lawyer taking a course of action the lawyer knew to be
fraudulent or illegal, and in one of the discipline cases the lawyer stipulated
he had actual knowledge he was engaging in fraudulent conduct.136 In none
of these cases did the lawyer claim ignorance of the client’s plans, and there
was no discussion about a lawyer having a duty to inquire or a discussion of
willful blindness. Similarly, the ethics opinion involved questions in which
the proposed conduct, putting excess tax stamps on a deed to inflate the
property’s value to mislead the public and inserting in a purchase agreement
for property a higher purchase price than the amount of money to be
exchanged at closing, were on their face explicitly fraudulent.137 Similar to
the discipline cases, this ethics opinion neither contained a discussion of a
duty to investigate nor a discussion of willful blindness.
Additionally, the CEPR stated “[s]ubstantial authority confirms that a
lawyer may not ignore the obvious,”138 and cited two secondary

133. Blatt, 324 A.2d at 18–19.
134. See id. at 19–20 (noting the sale of the property was contingent on the transfer of a liquor
license, and Blatt served as the solicitor for the city whose approval was necessary for the transfer of
the liquor license. Further, the court found that Blatt had a conflict of interest because Blatt gave
advice to the city council that ultimately approved the transfer of the liquor license “knowing the
agreement providing for the transfer of license was his own work product”).
135. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 3 n.12.
136. See In re Evans, 759 N.E.2d 1064, 1064 (Ind. 2001) (finding the lawyer agreed that “[b]y
filing a client’s federal tax return containing information he knew to be false, the respondent violated
Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(d)” among other ethics rules (emphasis added)); In re Harlow,
2004 WL 5215045, at *2 (Ma. State Bar. Discip. Bd. Dec. 14, 2004) (finding the lawyer engaging in
several fraudulent actions in connection with an escrow fund “assisted [his client] in conduct that [the
lawyer] knew was a fraud . . . in violation of MASS. R. PROF[’L] C[ONDUCT] 1.2(d)” (emphasis added)).
See generally State ex rel. Counsel for Discip. of Neb. Sup. Ct. v. Mills, 671 N.W.2d 765 (Neb. 2003)
(finding a lawyer acted knowingly by participating in an illegal scheme to avoid estate taxes by preparing
false documents, notarizing signatures without witnessing the persons signing the documents,
backdating documents, and lying about the documents).
137. N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 12, 2001 WL 1949450 (2001). The opinion states that “such
conduct involves dishonesty and misrepresentation” in violation of Rules 1.2(d) and 8.4(c) of the North
Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at *1. Rule 8.4(c) states that it is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that reflects
adversely on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer.” N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2020).
138. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 4.
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authorities.139 One of the authorities the CEPR cited, the Annotated Model
Rules of Professional Conduct,140 contains the three additional discipline cases
the CEPR referred to in a footnote as supporting a duty to investigate or
adopting a willful blindness standard for knowledge.141 There is no
discussion of a duty to investigate or willful blindness in one of the discipline
cases.142 The remaining two cases shed additional light on the CEPR’s
inadequate analysis of the authorities it cited because the holdings in the
cases do not support the CEPR’s opinion.
One of the cases involves Florida’s version of Rule 1.2(d), which differs
from the Model Rule by incorporating an explicit duty to investigate.143
Consider Model Rule 1.2(d), which states: “A lawyer shall not counsel a
client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent.”144 In contrast, Florida’s version states: “A lawyer
shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know is criminal or fraudulent.”145 The
Model Rules define “reasonably should know” to include a duty to

139. Id.; See WOLFRAM, supra note 19, at 696 (“[A] lawyer’s studied ignorance of a readily
accessible fact by consciously avoiding it is the functional equivalent of knowledge of the fact.”);
BENNETT & GUNNARSSON, supra note 25, at 47 (“A lawyer’s assistance in unlawful conduct is not
excused by a failure to inquire into the client’s objectives.”).
140. See generally BENNETT & GUNNARSSON, supra note 25.
141. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 4 n.13 (citing to the Annotated
Model Rules).
142. The case is In re Bloom, in which the Supreme Court of California disbarred a lawyer,
Edward Bloom, after he was convicted of several felony offenses arising out of his involvement in
transporting plastic explosives to Libya. In re Bloom, 745 P.2d 61 (Cal. 1987). Bloom admitted that
he knew the explosives could not legally be transported to Libya and that he mislabeled them in an
effort to conceal what they were. Id. at 62. Bloom claimed, however, that he acted in good faith
because he believed his client, who allegedly told Bloom that the transaction had been ordered by the
National Security Council. Id. His client denied that he told Bloom that the National Security Council
had authorized the shipment. Id. at 62–63. In disbarring Bloom, the court adopted the disciplinary
hearing panel’s findings, which included rejecting his good faith belief defense by resolving Bloom’s
credibility on this point against Bloom. Id. at 63. In other words, the hearing panel did not believe
Bloom because of his conduct and the contrary testimony of his client. There is no mention of any
duty to investigate or willful blindness.
143. See generally Fla. Bar v. Brown, 790 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 2001) (referencing Florida’s Rules of
Professional Conduct).
144. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
145. FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-1.2(d) (2020) (emphasis added). The Florida
Supreme Court summarized Florida’s Rule 4-1.2(d) as a “lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is criminal or fraudulent.”
Brown, 790 So. 2d at 1084.
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investigate,146 which is distinct from “know.”147 Unsurprisingly, the
Florida Supreme Court upheld discipline against a lawyer for violating
Florida’s Rule 1.2(d) because the lawyer “should have known [the client’s
request] was criminal or fraudulent.”148
The final case, In re Tocco,149 is an Arizona discipline case that explicitly
rejected a duty to investigate and is contrary authority to the CEPR’s
position. In Tocco, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected a disciplinary
commission’s finding that discipline was warranted because the lawyer,
Alicia Tocco, should have known her conduct was aiding clients in criminal or
fraudulent conduct in violation of Arizona’s Rule 1.2(d),150 which tracks
the language in Model Rule 1.2(d).151 The court stated “knows” in
Rule 1.2(d) “denote[s] ‘actual knowledge of the fact in question.’”152 The
Arizona Supreme Court drew the distinction between “knows” and
“reasonably should have known” by stating: “While actual knowledge can
be proven by circumstantial evidence, a mere showing that the attorney
reasonably should have known her conduct was in violation of the rules,
without more, is insufficient.”153 Based on the disciplinary commission’s
finding, the court determined Tocco was, at most, negligent, which was an
insufficient basis to find a violation of Arizona’s Rule 1.2(d).154

146. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(j) (“‘Reasonably should know’ when used in
reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain
the matter in question.”).
147. Id. at R. 1.0(f) (“‘Knowingly,’ ‘known,’ or ‘knows’ denotes actual knowledge of the fact in
question. A person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.”). The distinction between
know and reasonably should know is discussed infra at notes 190–92.
148. Brown, 790 So. 2d at 1088.
149. In re Tocco, 984 P.2d 539 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc).
150. Id. at 543. The Arizona Supreme Court summarized the Arizona rule by stating “ER 1.2(d)
prohibits an attorney from counseling or assisting a client in behavior which the lawyer knows is criminal
or fraudulent.” Id. at 542.
151. Model Rule 1.2(d) provides:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows
is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course
of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine
the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (emphasis added).
152. Tocco, 984 P.2d at 543 (emphasis in original).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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The CEPR also stated ABA Informal Opinion 1470 (1981),155 which was
issued prior to the adoption of the Model Rules, established that a lawyer
has a duty to inquire or investigate.156 ABA Informal Opinion 1470 stated:
“No Disciplinary Rule of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
specifically addresses a duty of factual inquiry as a predicate to undertaking
representation.”157 The Model Code contained DR 7-102(A)(7), which
stated: “In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not . . . [c]ounsel or
assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent.”158 This is the same prohibition with the same requirement of
actual knowledge found in Model Rule 1.2(d).159
While Informal Opinion 1470 acknowledged DR 7-102(A)(7) did not
directly address a duty to investigate, the opinion discussed circumstances
where it claimed such a duty existed. The opinion stated that “[a] lawyer
must be satisfied, on the facts before him and readily available to him, that
he can perform the requested services without abetting fraudulent or
criminal conduct”160 and “should not undertake representation in disregard
of facts suggesting that the representation might aid the client in
perpetrating a fraud or otherwise committing a crime.”161 These
admonitions may be read as consistent with the provision in the Model
Rules that “knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.”162 In other
words, the lawyer should not proceed when the facts known to the lawyer
suggest assisting the client would further fraudulent or criminal conduct.
Informal Opinion 1470 stated when the circumstances infer fraudulent
or criminal conduct, “the lawyer has a duty of further inquiry.”163 The
opinion did not cite any legal ethics authority for this proposition, but rather
quoted from a federal criminal case involving securities fraud, United States
v. Benjamin,164 and stated: “Lawyers have an obligation not to ‘shut their

155. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 1470 (1981).
156. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 4 (2020).
157. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 1470, at 1.
158. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. DR 7-102(A)(7) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
159. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer shall
not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent[.]” (emphasis added)).
160. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 1470, at 1.
161. Id. at 1.
162. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f).
163. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 1470, at 1–2.
164. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964).
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eyes to what was plainly to be seen . . . .’”165 In Benjamin, the court found
there was sufficient evidence Benjamin’s work for his client “gave him actual
knowledge” of various false and fraudulent acts in which he was
complicit.166 Thus, the Benjamin case supplied a helpful quote used in
Informal Opinion 1470, but the case turned on the sufficiency of the
evidence to prove actual knowledge.167
The CEPR decided Informal Opinion 1470 after Finman and Schneyer
concluded their study, so the opinion was not available for them to evaluate.
In addition, Finman and Schneyer confined their study to ABA formal
opinions because those opinions were ones that addressed matters of
widespread importance, had greater precedential weight, and presumably
were prepared more carefully.168 Applying the Finman and Schneyer
criterion that a “correct” opinion must be based on a tenable, rule-based
rationale,169 Informal Opinion 1470 would fail that test. Consequently, the
CEPR’s reliance on Informal Opinion 1470 as authority for finding a duty
to investigate is misplaced.
In adopting a duty to investigate, the CEPR’s opinion is in direct conflict
with the position of the Restatement that there is no duty to investigate.170
The Restatement’s counterpart to Model Rule 1.2(d) provides, in pertinent
part: “For purposes of professional discipline, a lawyer may not counsel or
assist a client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be criminal or fraudulent
or in violation of a court order with the intent of facilitating or encouraging
the conduct.”171 A comment explains that “[u]nder the actual knowledge
standard [in the Model Rules] . . . a lawyer is not required to make a particular
kind of investigation in order to ascertain more certainly what the facts are, although it
will often be prudent for the lawyer to do so.”172
Additional comments in the Restatement state, for purposes of lawyer
liability or discipline, “knowledge” does not include a duty to investigate.173
For example, a lawyer owes a duty of care to a nonclient when “the lawyer
knows that appropriate action by the lawyer is necessary” in order to “prevent
165.
at 863).
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 1470, at 1 (quoting Benjamin, 328 F.2d
Benjamin, 328 F.2d at 863.
Id. at 863–64.
Finman & Schneyer, supra note 27, at 92–93.
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 172–76 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 94(2) (AM. L. INST. 2000).
Id. § 94 cmt. g (emphasis added).
See infra notes 174–76 and accompanying text.
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or rectify the breach of a fiduciary duty owed by the [lawyer’s] client to the
nonclient, where (i) the breach is a crime or fraud or (ii) the lawyer has
assisted or is assisting the breach[.]”174 A comment explains that, as used
in this section of the Restatement, “‘knows’ neither assumes nor requires a
duty of inquiry.”175 Another comment explains: “Actual knowledge does
not include unknown information, even if a reasonable lawyer would have
discovered it through inquiry.”176
Accordingly, there is now a conflict between the CEPR’s ethics opinion
and the Restatement that is likely to create confusion among lawyers and
regulators as to which position should be followed. Neither the
Restatement nor ABA ethics opinions are binding authority, but both are
persuasive secondary authority.177 For the sake of prudence, a lawyer
should follow the ABA ethics opinion, but should a lawyer who does not
follow the ethics opinion face professional discipline? Until this conflict
between ABA Formal Opinion 491 and the Restatement is resolved, the
CEPR has interjected more uncertainty about Model Rule 1.2(d) rather than
providing useful interpretive guidance.
In sum, the CEPR cited to and relied upon several authorities that are
either contrary to or not entirely consistent with the CEPR’s finding that
under Model Rule 1.2(d) a failure to investigate under certain circumstances
“is willful blindness punishable under the actual knowledge standard of the
Rule.”178 In reaching this conclusion, ABA Formal Opinion 491 is also at
odds with the majority view of commentators and the Restatement that
Model Rule 1.2(d) does not contain a duty to investigate.179
3.

Problems of Interpretive Choice

“Problems of interpretive choice” refers to whether ABA Formal
Opinion 491 considered if different ethics rules would lead to conflicting
174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 51(4)(b) (emphasis added).
175. Id. § 51 cmt. h.
176. Id. § 120 cmt. c.
177. See A v. B., 726 A.2d 924, 928 (N.J. 1999) (stating the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers is “[p]ersuasive secondary authority”); Daniel C. Bitting & Cynthia L. Saiter,
Litigation Strategies for In-House Counsel, 36 CORP. COUNS. REV. 117, 127 (2017) (stating, while it is not
binding, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is “persuasive authority”); Finman &
Schneyer, supra note 27, at 83 n.65 (stating that some state ethics committees consider the ABA ethics
opinions “as highly persuasive precedent”); WOLFRAM, supra note 19, at 67 (stating courts show
deference to ethics opinions, especially in connection with disciplinary proceedings).
178. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 2 (2020).
179. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
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results, whether there is an ambiguity in a rule the opinion relied upon, and
whether the opinion identified the problems and considered relevant
precedents, values, and legislative history.180 As the following analysis
indicates, ABA Formal Opinion 491 also does not fulfill this criterion.
The drafters of the Model Rules specify the mental state, or mens rea,
required to prove a breach of ethical duties in many, but not all, of the Model
Rules.181 As Nancy Moore points out, some courts have held Model Rules
without a specified mental state have no scienter requirements, while other
courts have either considered such rules to require a mental state of
negligence or consider such rules as creating strict liability duties.182
The Model Rules specifying a mental state usually require some form of
knowledge.183 In addition to specifying the mental state of knowledge, one
Model Rule also specifies the alternative mental state of “reckless,”184 but
the Model Rules do not define reckless.185
In addition to “know” being the required mental state in Model
Rule 1.2(d), “know,” “knows,” or “knowingly” is also the mental state in
many of the other Model Rules.186 As discussed previously, the Model
Rules define “know,” “knows,” or “knowingly” as requiring actual

180.
181.
1, 1 (2010).
182.
183.
184.

See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
Id. at 3.
See infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text.
Model Rule 8.2(a) instructs:

A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard
as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer
or public legal officer, or a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
185. The terminology section does not define reckless. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.0. The Model Penal Code defines “recklessly” as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from
his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. L. INST. 1985).
186. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RR. 1.9(b), 1.11(b), 1.12(c), 1.13(b), 1.18(c), 3.3,
3.4(c), 3.8(d) & (g)–(h), 4.1, 4.2, 5.1(c)(1), 5.3(c)(1), 6.4, 6.5(a), 7.3(a) & (c)–(d), 8.1, 8.3, and 8.4(a) & (f)
(using the mental state of “knowledge,” “know,” “knows,” or “knowingly”).
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knowledge.187 In contrast, several other Model Rules impose a different
mental state that does create a duty to investigate by using the standard
“knows or reasonably should know.”188 For example, Model Rule 4.4(b) states
a lawyer “shall promptly notify the sender” when the lawyer “receives a
document or electronically stored information relating to the representation
of the lawyer’s client and [the lawyer] knows or reasonably should know that the
document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent.”189
The Model Rules state “‘[r]easonably should know’ when used in reference
to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence
would ascertain the matter in question.”190 The fact the Model Rules have
these two separate definitions demonstrates “knows” is a distinct mental
state from “reasonably should know.”191 As Roy Simon explains: “In
essence, the definition of ‘reasonably should know’ imposes a duty of
inquiry on a lawyer—a duty to ‘ascertain’ whatever a lawyer of ‘reasonable
prudence and competence’ would ascertain.”192
ABA Formal Opinion 491 failed to identify and note that a duty to
investigate exists when a lawyer “reasonably should know” something,
which is different from the Model Rule definition that “knows” means
actual knowledge. The CEPR did not discuss this distinction nor did the
CEPR explain why, in its view, the distinction did not matter. By imposing
a duty to investigate grounded in Model Rule 1.2(d), the CEPR read the rule
as if it stated: “A lawyer must not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client,
in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is criminal or
fraudulent.” If the drafters of the Model Rules meant to have Model
Rule 1.2(d) read that way, they would have drafted it differently. This is
exactly what the drafters of Florida’s Rule 1.2(d) did when they included “or
reasonably should know” in the state’s Rule 1.2(d).193
187. See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
188. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RR. 1.13(f), 2.3(b), 2.4(b), 3.6(a), 4.3, 4.4(b), and
8.4(g) (emphasis added).
189. Id. at R. 4.4(b) (emphasis added). Model Rule 4.4(b) states: “A lawyer who receives a
document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and
[the lawyer] knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored information
was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.” Id.
190. Id. at R. 1.0(j).
191. Donaldson, supra note 16, at 374.
192. ROY SIMON & NICOLE HYLAND, SIMON’S NEW YORK RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT ANNOTATED § 1.0:49 (2019 ed.). Roy Simon and Nicole Hyland’s treatise analyzes New
York’s version of Model Rule 1.2(d), which tracks the language in the Model Rule.
193. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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The CEPR also failed to consider the history of the ABA’s concern over
lawyer involvement in Enron and other corporate scandals and whether
there should be changes to the Model Rules. In the Preliminary Report of the
American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility (Preliminary
Report),194 the Task Force stated that “knowing” conduct in Model
Rule 1.2(d) and other rules “presumably does not reach conduct covered by
the term ‘reasonably should know.’”195 In light of this distinction, the
Preliminary Report included a proposal to amend the Model Rules to
“[e]xpand Rules 1.2(d), 1.13, and 4.1 to reach beyond actual knowledge to
circumstances in which the lawyer reasonably should know of the crime or
fraud.”196 Unlike the CEPR, the Task Force recognized amending Model
Rule 1.2(d) would be necessary to require a duty to investigate.
After receiving comments on the proposals in the Preliminary Report, the
Task Force issued the Report of the American Bar Association on Corporate
Responsibility (Report).197 The Report dropped the proposal to amend
Rules 1.2(d), 4.1, and 1.13 to change “know” to “reasonably should
know.”198 The Report noted the draft proposal had received “substantial
criticism” and that such a change “may impose a duty, of uncertain extent,
to investigate that could only be evaluated after the fact with the benefit of
hindsight.”199 ABA Formal Opinion 491 introduced the uncertain duty to
investigate that the Task Force wanted to avoid.
4.

Rigor

The CEPR also took what looks like a “kitchen sink” approach in finding
a duty to investigate. The CEPR cited seven different Model Rules as
supporting its imposition of a duty to investigate, but it did not clearly,
thoroughly, or reliably explain how each rule supposedly supports its
conclusion.200
194. ABA TASK FORCE ON CORP. RESP., PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2002) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE,
PRELIMINARY REPORT], reprinted in 58 BUS. LAW. 189 (2002).
195. Id. at 33.
196. Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added).
197. ABA TASK FORCE ON CORP. RESP., REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2003) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE, REPORT],
reprinted in 59 BUS. LAW. 145 (2003).
198. Id. at 166–67 n.76.
199. Id.
200. The CEPR discussed Model Rule 1.2(d) for four pages and the other six rules for a total
of two and one-half pages. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 3–9 (2020).
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The CEPR somehow found the duty to investigate in the knowledge
element of Model Rule 1.2(d) by invoking the criminal law doctrine of
willful blindness.201 Criminal statutes often “require proof that a defendant
acted knowingly or willfully,” and “the doctrine of willful blindness,” also
referred to as willful ignorance, provides that a defendant cannot avoid
criminal liability under such statutes “by deliberately shielding themselves
from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the
circumstances.”202
For criminal cases, willful blindness is defined in criminal codes and
applied through jury instructions. For example, the Model Penal Code
provides, in pertinent part: “When knowledge of the existence of a particular
fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is
aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it
does not exist.”203 The federal jury instruction incorporates this concept
of willful blindness or ignorance, but notes a jury must also “find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with . . . a conscious purpose to
avoid learning the truth . . . . However, guilty knowledge may not be
established by demonstrating that the defendant was merely negligent,
foolish or mistaken.”204
All Circuits that have considered how willful blindness may satisfy the
knowledge element agree a defendant must meet at least these two
201. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 6.
202. Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766–67 & n.7 (2011) (referring to
willful ignorance in criminal law).
203. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (AM. L. INST. 1985).
204. 1 LEONARD SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL
¶ 3A.01, at 3A-2 (2020). The instruction, in its entirety, states:
In determining whether the defendant acted knowingly, you may consider whether the defendant
deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him. If you find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with (or that the defendant’s ignorance was
solely and entirely the result of) a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth (e.g., that the
statement was false), then this element may be satisfied. However, guilty knowledge may not be
established by demonstrating that the defendant was merely negligent, foolish or mistaken.
If you find that the defendant was aware of a high probability that (e.g., the statement was false)
and that the defendant acted with deliberate disregard of the facts, you may find that the defendant
acted knowingly. However, if you find that the defendant actually believed that (e.g., the
statement was true), he may not be convicted.
It is entirely up to you whether you find that the defendant deliberately closed his eyes and any
inferences to be drawn from the evidence on this issue.
Id. at 1 (emphasis in original).
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conditions: (1) “subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact
exists”; and (2) “take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”205
At least three Circuits also require a third condition—that the defendant
have a motive for remaining ignorant of the facts, such as to preserve a
defense in the event of prosecution.206
In its opinion, the CEPR did not address many of the issues surrounding
the doctrine of willful blindness it grafted onto the Model Rules from
criminal law. For example, should disciplinary authorities refrain from
disciplining a lawyer who unwittingly assists a client in a crime or fraud? In
a federal criminal case, the jury is instructed not to find a lawyer guilty for
“merely [being] negligent, foolish or mistaken.”207 Should not the
unwitting lawyer have the same safe harbor from professional discipline?
The Arizona Supreme Court determined Alicia Tocco deserved such a safe
harbor because the disciplinary commission found “Tocco was, at worst,
negligent. Thus, there could be no determination that she violated Ethical
Rules 1.2, 3.3, and 4.1.”208
205. Glob.-Tech Appliances, 563 U.S. at 769.
206. See United States v. Willis, 277 F.3d 1026, 1032 (8th Cir. 2002) (“A willful blindness or
deliberate indifference instruction is appropriate when there is evidence to ‘support the inference that
the defendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question and purposely
contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense’ against subsequent prosecution.” (emphasis
added) (quoting United States v. Barnhart, 979 F.2d 647, 652 (8th Cir. 1992))); see also United States v.
Delreal-Ordones, 213 F.3d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he district court may tender a deliberate
ignorance instruction when the Government presents evidence that the defendant ‘purposely contrived to
avoid learning all of the facts’ in order to have a defense in the event of prosecution.” (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 1999))); United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d
1137, 1149 (11th Cir. 2003) (“An instruction on deliberate ignorance is appropriate only if it is shown
that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact in question and that the defendant
‘purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent
prosecution.’” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1571 (11th
Cir. 1991))).
207. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
208. In re Tocco, 984 P.2d 539, 543 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc). The reference to possible violations
of Arizona’s Rule 3.3 and 4.1 related to an allegation that Tocco violated Rule 3.3(a) (“requiring candor
toward [the] tribunal”) and Rule 4.1 (“prohibiting false statements of material facts”) by failing to
amend bankruptcy filings after she became aware “that they contained false information.” Tocco,
984 P.2d at 542–43. Tocco is not the only case in which disciplinary authorities have refused to equate
“know” with “should have known” and have rejected a duty to investigate. For example, the Iowa
Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct did not recommend discipline and the Iowa
Supreme Court did not discipline a lawyer, Oscar Jones, for failing to investigate his client’s story about
a $25,300,000 contract to build a pipeline in Nigeria. Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Pro. Ethics & Conduct v.
Jones, 606 N.W.2d 5, 6–8 (Iowa 2000) (per curiam). Taking his client’s story at face value, Jones
persuaded a former client to loan his current client with the Nigerian deal $5,000 as part of $25,300
supposedly to purchase risk insurance to secure the Nigerian pipeline payment. Id. at 6–7. The Iowa
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Also, which of the criminal law tests is the CEPR adopting for its willful
blindness standard? Is the CEPR adopting a standard that requires only a
two-factor test—that the lawyer (1) have suspicions about the fact for which
knowledge is required, and (2) deliberately refrain from investigating the
fact?209 Or, is the CEPR also adopting the third factor, as some Circuits
have, that the lawyer have a motive for remaining ignorant of the facts?210
These questions are not answered by the CEPR’s opinion, which simply
states to prevent possible “criminal charges or civil liability, in addition to
bar discipline . . . a lawyer must inquire further when the facts before the
lawyer create a high probability that a client seeks to use the lawyer’s services
for criminal or fraudulent activity.”211 Without providing guidance as to a
possible defense of negligence and which definition of willful blindness
disciplinary authorities should use, the CEPR’s opinion leaves two
important questions unanswered that would likely lead to different
outcomes in disciplinary matters.
In addition to looking to Model Rule 1.2(d) as the primary source for a
duty to investigate, the CEPR stated “[a] lawyer may be obliged to inquire
further in order to meet duties of competence, diligence, communication,
honesty, and withdrawal under Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.13, 1.16, and 8.4.”212
The CEPR then discussed each of these other duties briefly and why there
may be a duty to inquire.213
None of the additional Model Rules the CEPR identified expressly states
there is a duty to investigate or inquire of a client. For example, the duty of
competence in Model Rule 1.1 states that “[a] lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation.”214 Nothing in the text of the rule
discusses a duty to investigate. To support finding a duty to investigate in
Model Rule 1.1, the CEPR quoted from a comment to the rule that
“[c]ompetent handling of a particular matter requires inquiry into and

Supreme Court, like its disciplinary commission, found “the record does not establish that Jones . . .
knew that the Nigerian transaction was fraudulent,” although the court noted that “the story sounds
incredible.” Id. at 7–8.
209. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
211. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 6 (2020).
212. Id. at 7.
213. Id. at 7–9.
214. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem.”215 The reference
to “inquiry” in the comment is connected to analyzing the factual and legal
elements of the client’s “problem.”
In other words, competent
representation requires the lawyer understand and analyze the relevant facts
and law necessary to represent the client.216
While the CEPR relied on a comment for the duty to inquire in Model
Rule 1.1, the Model Rules state the “[c]omments are intended as guides to
interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative.”217 In other words,
it is the text of Model Rule 1.1 and the other Model Rules that create and
define the scope of the various duties, and none of the rules refer to a duty
to investigate.218 The CEPR appeared to be bootstrapping the comment’s
reference to “inquiry” into a duty to investigate in Model Rule 1.1, and
engaged in similarly strained readings of the other Model Rules it claimed
require a duty to investigate.219
With respect to the other Model Rules the CEPR cited as sources of the
duty to investigate, the CEPR stated the duty of diligence in Model Rule 1.3
“requires that a lawyer ascertain the relevant facts and law in a timely and
appropriately thorough manner.”220 However, the CEPR’s opinion does
not clearly explain how this creates a duty to investigate.
The CEPR also cited language from Model Rule 1.4(a)(5), the duty of
communication, that the lawyer shall “[consult] with the client regarding
‘any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct’ arising from the client’s
expectation of assistance that is not permitted by the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law.”221 As the language of Model Rule 1.4(a)(5) makes
clear, such a duty exists when the lawyer knows the client expects assistance
contrary to the ethics rules or law. Although Formal Opinion 491 did not

215. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 7 (quoting MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1. cmt. 5). The quote in the opinion uses the word “requires” instead of
“includes,” which is the original word used in the comment.
216. See BENNETT & GUNNARSSON, supra note 25, at 25 (“The interrelated obligations of
thoroughness and preparation require a lawyer to investigate all relevant facts and research applicable
law.”).
217. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope 21 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). George Cohen
points out “that statement itself is a comment (though not one accompanying a rule), and so arguably
is itself not authoritative.” Cohen, supra note 13, at 120 n.23.
218. See infra notes 220–26 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
220. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 8 (2020).
221. Id. at 8 (quoting Rule 1.4(a)(5) of the Model Rules).
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say so explicitly, it appears as though the CEPR read “knows” as “knows or
reasonably should know,” again contrary to the plain language in the rule.222
With regard to a lawyer’s duties while representing an entity, the CEPR
addressed a lawyer’s duty under Model Rule 1.13, which contains the
provision that “[i]f a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer,
employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in
action . . . that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, . . . and
that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer
shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization.”223 Again, there is an actual knowledge element in Model
Rule 1.13, which the CEPR did not address.
Additionally, the CEPR found a duty to investigate in Model Rule 8.4,
which makes it professional misconduct for a lawyer to participate in
criminal or fraudulent conduct, noting criminal or fraudulent conduct may
be found “without proof of actual knowledge.”224 This observation is
correct—it does not independently create a duty to investigate. The CEPR
is merely noting that some crimes or frauds may be proven without proving
the mental state of actual knowledge.225
Finally, the CEPR concluded when a lawyer seeks to investigate and “the
client or prospective client refuses to provide information necessary to
assess the legality of the proposed transaction, the lawyer must ordinarily
decline the representation or withdraw under Rule 1.16.”226 This is a
curious statement because one wonders under what circumstances it would
be permissible not to decline the representation or withdraw, given the
CEPR stated that withdrawal was ordinarily required, suggesting withdrawal
was not always required.
As appellate judges considering a myriad of arguments on appeal for
reversal in criminal cases have noted, the kitchen sink approach usually
results—as it did in the CEPR’s opinion—in lack of a thorough and reliable
analysis of any of the arguments.227 The kitchen sink approach may also
222. See supra notes 186–92 and accompanying text.
223. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (emphasis added);
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 8 (emphasis added) (quoting Rule 1.13(b) of
the Model Rules).
224. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 7.
225. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
226. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 13 (emphasis added).
227. Cf. generally id. (analyzing and applying a plethora of rules rather than conducting a more
focused analysis). See Commonwealth v. Perez, 93 A.3d 829, 837 (Pa. 2014) (“Appellant raises twentyfive lettered issues, nearly exhausting the alphabet, and causing us to reiterate that volume does not
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suggest that CEPR members were not confident that the duty to investigate
is firmly grounded in any one rule.
5.

Clarity

One hallmark of confused and confusing mental state analysis is failure
to distinguish between mental state elements and conduct elements. In its
opinion, the CEPR does precisely this, failing to distinguish between and
thus conflating issues involving mental states, such as knowledge and willful
blindness, and issues involving conduct, such as inquiring of the client and
refraining from providing assistance to the client.
The CEPR also did not provide sufficient guidance to lawyers about
when the duty to investigate arises. The CEPR stated the duty to investigate
is triggered when there is a “high probability” the client is seeking services
to further criminal or fraudulent activity.228 What level of probability of
illegality qualifies as “high”? In other words, what level of risk of illegality
is required to trigger the duty? How does a lawyer’s past interactions with a
client or lack of interactions with a new potential client figure into this risk
calculation? For example, what is the significance of the client being a new
client about whom the lawyer knows little or a client with whom the lawyer
has had a long-term relationship involving legitimate business transactions?
The CEPR stated a lawyer must make “reasonable inquiry.”229 How
much inquiry a “reasonable inquiry” requires is not clear. Just as there is
lack of clarity about what level of probability of illegality triggers the duty to
inquire, it is also unclear what level of probability of legality is required to
satisfy the duty to investigate. Must the lawyer be completely certain a project
is legal (i.e., a 100% probability of legality) in order to proceed with the
project? Or does some lower level of certainty satisfy the duty to investigate,
such as “more likely legal than not”?
The CEPR concluded a lawyer violates Model Rule 1.2(d) if a lawyer
assists a client when the lawyer is willfully blind about or consciously disregards a
project’s illegality.230 The CEPR did not define either of these two phrases,
and treated them as synonymous.
equal quality.”); Kristen K. Robbins, The Inside Scoop: What Federal Judges Really Think About the Way
Lawyers Write, 8 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 257, 282 n.43 (2002) (noting judges want
law students to be taught “not to throw in the kitchen sink” because “sharper arguments are more
likely to be winners”).
228. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491, at 3.
229. Id. at 2.
230. Id. at 13.
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Another uncertainty attends the use of willful blindness. Is willful
blindness a type of knowledge? Or is it an alternative mental state to
knowledge the CEPR views as equally blameworthy, one that involves a
combination of (1) lack of actual knowledge (i.e., the “blindness” or
“disregard”), (2) purpose to avoid knowledge (i.e., being “willful” or
“conscious”), and (3) awareness of some probability less than certainty (i.e.,
less than knowledge) of the fact at issue? The CEPR neither addressed nor
resolved this issue. The CEPR merely stated in a footnote that “the standard
of actual knowledge set out in the text of Model Rules 1.2(d) and 1.0(f) is
met by appropriate evidence of willful blindness,”231 thereby equating
“willful blindness” with “actual knowledge.”
IV. SHOULD THERE BE A DUTY TO INVESTIGATE?
I am not necessarily opposed to lawyers having a duty to inquire into the
legality of client transactions in which they provide legal services, but the
CEPR’s attempt to create such a duty through an ethics opinion leaves too
much unclear. I believe the duty to investigate in Formal Opinion 491 is illdefined because the CEPR did not engage the legal profession in
considering the framing of a duty to investigate, and the lack of process in
adopting its duty to investigate calls into question validity of such a duty.
A. The House of Delegates Should Consider Whether to Amend the Model Rules
If there is to be a duty to investigate, such a duty should be established
by the ABA House of Delegates amending the Model Rules. The CEPR
has requested changes to the Model Rules several times in the past,232 and
I believe it should do so with regard to amending Model Rule 1.2(d) or
establishing a duty to investigate in a new rule.
For example, the CEPR filed a motion with the ABA House of Delegates
to amend Model Rule 8.4 (defining professional misconduct), and the
House of Delegates adopted the amendment in August 2016.233 The new
provision, Model Rule 8.4(g), makes it professional misconduct to “engage
231. Id. at 5 n.22.
232. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 25, at 357 (discussing the CEPR recommendation to the ABA
House of Delegates to amend Model Rule 4.2).
233. See Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility: Past Events, Resolution 109 Adopted
by ABA HOD, ABA, [hereinafter Resolution 109 Adopted by ABA], https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/ethicsandprofessionalresponsibili
ty/ [https://perma.cc/Q7QS-KVP7] (providing information regarding the process to amend Model
Rule 8.4).
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in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment
or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or
socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law.”234 A new
comment to the rule explains such harassment or discrimination
“undermine[s] confidence in the legal profession and the legal system.”235
At the time the CEPR recommended the amendment, Model Rule 8.4
already contained a provision, 8.4(d), which defined professional
misconduct to include “engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.”236 In 1998, a comment to Model Rule 8.4—
which has since been largely incorporated into the current Model
Rule 8.4(g)—explained: “A lawyer who, in the course of representing a
client, knowingly manifests, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based
upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or
socioeconomic status violates paragraph (d) when such actions are
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”237 While this comment stated
such discrimination and harassment would violate Model Rule 8.4(d) only
when a lawyer acted while representing a client and when the actions would
be “prejudicial to the administration of justice,” the comment provided
interpretive guidance and was not binding.238 I believe a reasonable person
would view a lawyer engaging in harassment or discrimination on the basis
of race, sex, religion, or the other categories listed to be engaging in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice even without the amendment. If
the CEPR has the type of authority to interpret the Model Rules broadly,
such as it asserted by attempting to create a duty to investigate through
Formal Opinion 491, the CEPR surely could have interpreted harassment
or discrimination based on race, sex, religion, or other characteristics to be
prejudicial to the administration of justice without seeking to amend Model
Rule 8.4.

234. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
235. Id. at R. 8.4 cmt. 3; see Resolution 109 Adopted by ABA, supra note 233 (providing information
on the amendment process regarding Comment [3] to Model Rule 8.4).
236. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d).
237. Compare Kristine A. Kubes et al., The Evolution of Model Rule 8.4(g): Working to Eliminate Bias,
Discrimination, and Harassment in the Practice of Law, ABA (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/construction_industry/publications/under_construction/2019/spring/model-rule-8-4/
[https://perma.cc/S37D-KUXS] (delving into the evolution of the Rule), with MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (providing the current version).
238. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text.
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Instead of finding harassment or discrimination to be prejudicial to the
administration of justice in Model Rule 8.4(d), the CEPR engaged in a full
airing of the issue.239 I believe this was the better choice because to
interpret Model Rule 8.4(d) broadly, especially given the limiting language
in the comment to the rule, the CEPR would be attempting to actually
amend it. Instead, the CEPR took several steps to obtain input on the issue:
it released a working draft of the proposed rule and comment amendments
in July 2015; held a roundtable discussion of the draft rule and comment
amendments at the ABA Annual Meeting; issued a draft proposal to amend
Model Rule 8.4 and its comments in December 2015; held a public hearing
in February 2016; and released a revised proposal for the amendments prior
to the House of Delegates voting on them in August 2016.240 This process
provided multiple opportunities for input from the legal profession.
Creating a duty to investigate would benefit from such a process. Moreover,
if the ABA House of Delegates adopted an investigative duty, the CEPR
could issue an ethics opinion providing additional guidance, just as it did in
issuing ABA Formal Opinion 493,241 which discussed the purpose, scope,
and application of Model Rule 8.4(g).242
Even though the CEPR has issued Formal Opinion 491, it is not too late
for it to recommend an amendment to Model Rule 1.2(d) or another rule to
locate the duty to investigate squarely in the explicit language of a rule. At
the same time the CEPR issued Formal Opinion 95-396, which interpreted
the word “party” in Model Rule 4.2 to mean “person” for the anti-contact
rule,243 the CEPR also proposed an amendment to Rule 4.2 to the House
of Delegates to “replace the word ‘party’ with the word ‘person,’” which
would make it explicit how Rule 4.2 should be applied.244 Subsequent to
the CEPR issuing its opinion, the House of Delegates acted on the CEPR’s
recommendation and amended Rule 4.2 to substitute “person” for
“party.”245 At a minimum, I believe the CEPR should similarly petition the
House of Delegates to consider whether and how the Model Rules should

239. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
240. Resolution 109 Adopted by ABA, supra note 233.
241. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 493, at 2 (2020). The CEPR issued
Formal Opinion 493 in July 2020. Id. at 1. The ABA House of Delegates Amended Model Rule 8.4
to include Model Rule 8.4(g) in August 2019. Id. at 1 n.1.
242. Id. at 1.
243. See Hellman, supra note 25, at 356–57.
244. Id. at 357.
245. Id.
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be amended to create a duty to investigate into the legality of client
transactions they assist. Only a change to the language of the Model Rules
will bring clarity to such a duty.
If there is a change to the Model Rules to include a duty to investigate,
serious consideration should be given to whether and to what extent such a
duty should be imposed in litigation settings. To illustrate just a few of the
issues that could arise, consider the following scenarios drawn from criminal
and employment law.
B. A Duty to Investigate in Litigation Settings
The CEPR stated it was addressing the duty to inquire in non-litigation
settings,246 and Formal Opinion 491 did not address a client’s request for
legal assistance in connection with litigation.247 But nothing in the cited
Model Rules would limit such a duty to non-litigation settings because the
rules the CEPR cited as the sources of the duty to investigate apply equally
to lawyers doing transactional work, litigation, or other lawyering unless the
Model Rules specifically limit the rule to a certain group of lawyers.248 For
example, some Model Rules are limited to different types of lawyers, such
as government lawyers in Model Rule 1.11,249 lawyers for organizations in
Model Rule 1.13,250 lawyers serving as a third-party neutral in Model
Rule 2.4,251 and prosecutors in Model Rule 3.8.252 Presently, one of the
Model Rules imposes a duty for a lawyer acting as an advocate in nonadjudicative proceedings, such as appearing “before a legislative body or
246. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 491 (titling the opinion:
Obligations Under Rule 1.2(d) to Avoid Counseling or Assisting in a Crime or Fraud in Non-Litigation Settings).
247. “This opinion does not address the application of rules triggering a duty to inquire where
a client requests legal services in connection with litigation.” ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp.,
Formal Op. 491, at 2 n.6.
248. The Model Code made explicit that “the Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly applied
to all lawyers, regardless of the nature of their professional activities.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP.
Preliminary Statement (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). Although the Model Rules do not state this explicitly,
commentators agree that unless a rule’s language limits it to a certain type of lawyer or legal service, it
is applicable to all lawyers. See Marshall J. Breger, Disqualification for Conflicts of Interest and the Legal Aid
Attorney, 62 B.U. L. REV. 1115, 1122 (1982) (“It has been generally argued that present ethical doctrine
constitutes a unified code of ethics which applies to the entire [legal] profession.”); Paul R. Tremblay,
Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1129 (1990) (“Current
professional responsibility authority does not distinguish the role obligations of legal services lawyers
from those of private lawyers representing private clients.”).
249. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
250. Id. at R. 1.13.
251. Id. at R. 2.4.
252. Id. at R. 3.8.
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administrative agency.”253 Several other Model Rules address a lawyer’s
duties as an advocate in adjudicative proceedings, such as bringing only
meritorious claims and contentions,254 expediting litigation,255 exhibiting
candor toward the tribunal,256 and maintaining fairness to opposing parties
and counsel.257 None of the Model Rules are limited to representing clients
in transactional matters, such as those described in Formal Opinion 491.
Without language in a Model Rule limiting a duty to investigate for nonlitigation matters, what is to stop disciplinary authorities from applying a
duty to investigate in all litigation settings? For example, if an unemployed
prospective client charged with felonious assault wants to pay his lawyer a
large fee in cash, is the defense lawyer required to inquire into the fee’s
source before accepting the cash?258 There is a federal law requiring the
reporting of the receipt of cash in excess of $10,000.259 A lawyer can be
disciplined for failing to report their receipt of more than $10,000 cash from
a client to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).260 Pursuant to Model
Rule 8.4(b), such a lawyer may be disciplined for “commit[ting] a criminal
act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness
as a lawyer in other respects.”261 If a duty to investigate applies equally to
litigation settings, a lawyer would not only have to report the receipt of the
cash but perhaps investigate how the client obtained the funds. Would such
253. Id. at R. 3.9.
254. Id. at R. 3.1.
255. Id. at R. 3.2.
256. Id. at R. 3.3.
257. Id. at R. 3.4.
258. A lawyer may not accept the fruits of a crime because to do so would be a form of aiding
and abetting. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 10.49, at 10-234–35
(4th ed. 2020). For this reason, some commentators argue that a defense lawyer has an obligation to
“audit” the source of fees in certain criminal cases such as theft crimes, sales of narcotics, and other
crimes where the fee is the fruit of the crime. Id.
259. Federal law requires that anyone engaged in a trade or business must report cash payments
in excess of $10,000 to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and to reveal the identity of the persons
making such payments. 26 U.S.C § 6050I. Courts have held the federal common law of attorney-client
privilege and a state’s rules of professional conduct do not permit a lawyer to withhold a client’s identity
in filing the required form with the IRS. See, e.g., U.S. v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding neither the federal common law of attorney-client privilege nor a state’s rules of professional
conduct protect a client’s identity from being revealed in the reporting requirement of 26 U.S.C.
§ 6050I).
260. See, e.g., In re Chung, 230 A.D.2d 300, 301–02 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (suspending a lawyer
from the practice of law for one year after he pleaded guilty to failing to file the required IRS form
following receipt of over $10,000 in cash from a client).
261. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b).
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a duty to investigate exist if the amount of cash is less than $10,000? If so,
would such inquiries, regardless of the amount in question, undermine a
client’s Sixth Amendment right to loyal counsel free from conflicts?262
Consider a lawyer representing an immigrant client who entered the
United States lawfully but used a fraudulent Social Security number to gain
employment, and whose employer failed to pay her for hours worked.263
As Christine Cimini explains: “It is a crime to use a false Social Security
number to obtain benefits, but the crime is completed when the false
representation is made”—i.e., when the client seeks legal assistance in
obtaining the wages owed.264 But, if the lawyer represents the client and
the client’s claim is successful, would the lawyer be assisting the client in a
crime or fraud if the client used the money recovered to stay in the United
States?265 If so, before taking the case, would the duty to investigate require
the lawyer to ask the client what the client would do with the money if the
lawsuit is successful? As Cimini points out, interpreting Model Rule 1.2(d)
in such a way would run contrary to the important role that lawyers play in
providing access to justice.266 Still, a duty to investigate in a litigation
context may lead some lawyers to refrain from representing such a client if
the client responded that he or she would use any money recovered to
remain in the United States.
As these two examples point out, whether there should be a duty to
investigate in litigation settings needs to be carefully considered. If there is
such a duty, it should be clearly explained, something Formal Opinion 491
does not do.267

262. “A concurrent conflict of interest” would exist if “there is a significant risk that the
representation of [the client] will be materially limited” by the personal interests of the lawyer. Id.
at R. 1.7(a)(2).
263. Christine Cimini developed this hypothetical in an article discussing ethical issues involving
undocumented workers. Christine N. Cimini, Ask, Don’t Tell: Ethical Issues Surrounding Undocumented
Workers’ Status in Employment Litigation, 61 STAN. L. REV. 355, 371–72 (2008).
264. Id. (footnotes omitted).
265. Cimini pointed out that under federal law, unlawful presence in the United States is not a
crime, but it may be a fraud. Id. at 372.
266. Id.
267. See supra Part III.B.5.
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V. CONCLUSION
As I stated at the outset, I am not necessarily opposed to lawyers having
a duty to investigate the legality of client transactions in which they provide
legal services. The CEPR’s attempt to create such a duty through its ethics
opinion, however, leaves too much unclear. The CEPR stated it was
addressing the duty to inquire in non-litigation settings, but without such a
duty being clearly limited to non-litigation settings in the Model Rules,
disciplinary authorities may conclude that a duty exists in litigation settings
as well. As the criminal and employment law examples indicate, an illdefined duty to investigate in litigation settings could run counter to
important client rights and some policy objectives of the legal profession.268
If a lawyer should have a duty to investigate, such a duty should be created
through the regular Model Rule amendment process rather than the CEPR
interpreting rules that do not say anything about such a duty. The
amendment process should allow for full consideration of the following:
(1) the pros and cons of imposing such a duty; (2) whether a duty to
investigate should be limited to non-litigation matters; (3) when and how
such a duty is triggered; (4) when and how such a duty is satisfied; and
(5) how the duty should be expressed. A process such as the one the CEPR
and the ABA House of Delegates engaged in to amend Model Rule 8.4 to
include provision 8.4(g) would help answer these and perhaps other
issues.269 The procedure outlined above would also hopefully do a better
job than the CEPR did in addressing the other unclear aspects of the
opinion.

268. See supra notes 262, 266 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text.

